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Abstract
The present study addresses the problem whether negative priming (NP) is due to information processing in perception,
recognition or selection. We argue that most NP studies confound priming and perceptual similarity of prime-probe
episodes and implement a color-switch paradigm in order to resolve the issue. In a series of three identity negative priming
experiments with verbal naming response, we determined when NP and positive priming (PP) occur during a trial. The first
experiment assessed the impact of target color on priming effects. It consisted of two blocks, each with a different fixed
target color. With respect to target color no differential priming effects were found. In Experiment 2 the target color was
indicated by a cue for each trial. Here we resolved the confounding of perceptual similarity and priming condition. In trials
with coinciding colors for prime and probe, we found priming effects similar to Experiment 1. However, trials with a target
color switch showed such effects only in trials with role-reversal (distractor-to-target or target-to-distractor), whereas the
positive priming (PP) effect in the target-repetition trials disappeared. Finally, Experiment 3 split trial processing into two
phases by presenting the trial-wise color cue only after the stimulus objects had been recognized. We found recognition in
every priming condition to be faster than in control trials. We were hence led to the conclusion that PP is strongly affected
by perception, in contrast to NP which emerges during selection, i.e., the two effects cannot be explained by a single
mechanism.
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Introduction
Selective attention is the process of extracting behaviorally
relevant information from the environment which provides us with
a permanent stream of sensory input. Successful processing of a
stimulus involves the act of focusing on the relevant as well as
ignoring the irrelevant information. Contradicting the early
hypothesis that attending is active and ignoring is passive, the
active nature of ignoring has been revealed experimentally [1].
Subjects had to process lists of colored words in a standard Stroop
task where the stimulus cards were ordered such that the ignored
meaning of a color word always became the color in which the
next word was written and which was to be named. People were
slower in responding to those lists compared to unrelated ink
colors and color names. Even if the semantic meaning of the color
words has been ignored to fulfill the task, it must have entered the
cognitive system. These results showed that stimulus selection can
be assessed by systematic variation of distracting information. An
important approach to investigate the processing of distracting
stimuli is provided by the so-called negative priming (NP)
paradigm where always a pair of consecutive tasks, called the
prime and probe trial, are considered. Those tasks present a
relevant and irrelevant stimulus – the target and distractor – and
require a response to the target. NP manifests in a slowdown of the
reaction in response to a probe target that was presented as the
prime distractor. NP is considered a well suited approach to assess
the selective aspect of attentional processing, since the ignored
stimuli can be shown to be actively processed [2,3]. Usually, NP is
contrasted with the positive priming (PP) effect, a response-
facilitation, which is observed when a target from the prime trial is
repeated as target in the subsequent trial, the probe.
The NP effect has been observed in a wide variety of
experimental contexts and therefore is a reliable and general
phenomenon, for reviews see [4,5]. In spite of this apparent
robustness, many factors have been identified that can modulate,
cancel or even reverse priming effects, e.g., the response stimulus
interval [6–8], absence [7,9–12] or saliency of the probe distractor
[13,14], task instructions [15], age [16–18], sex [19], perceptual
load [4,15,20], composition of trials [21,22], stimulus presentation
time [23], stimulus onset asynchrony [10] and prime awareness
[24]. The complexity of the phenomenon is the reason for many
different theoretical accounts that have been formulated over the
years, e.g. [3,8,25–30].
Historically, the most influential explanation of NP is distractor
inhibition theory, which assumes irrelevant stimulus representa-
tions are actively suppressed, thereby supporting the selection of
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cognitive representation of the distractor is postulated to persist
for some time which produces the NP effect. Distractor inhibition
theory has also been expressed in terms of a dynamical model:
When perceptual input is no longer present, persisting inhibition
drives the distractor representation below a baseline activation
level. The NP effect directly results from the time the probe target
representation activation needs to reach baseline activation again.
Distractor inhibition assumes selection to operate on a semantic or
postcategorial level [2] and it can thus also explain findings that
report NP in semantic priming tasks, e.g. [32]. The slowdown of
the reaction in the probe trial can thus be regarded as a direct
correlate of the amount of inhibition in the prime display.
Distractor inhibition theory was developed in numerous contri-
butions over the years [2,3,14,31,33–37].
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus in the literature on
identity negative priming that NP is primarily a memory
phenomenon, i.e., it is better explained by effects stemming from
memory retrieval rather than of distractor inhibition. Retrieval
theories originate from Logan’s instance theory of automatization,
which states that the processing of similar successive trials leads to
a high level of automatization and optimization [38]. One
optimizing strategy is a retrieval of the previous episode from
memory whenever stimuli or even parts of it are repeated.
Simultaneously, a slower, algorithmic processing is carried out
which can interfere with the retrieved information. Episodic
retrieval theory [8], assumes the distractor object to be stored in
conjunction with the directive not to respond to it. A perceptual
similarity of prime and probe stimuli, e.g. if an object is repeated,
triggers an incidental retrieval of the prime episode. The
associated inhibitory directive is recalled as well. In case of
congruent instructions as in the case of a target repetition
condition, the retrieval is beneficial, whereas in distractor-target
trials incongruent directives interfere, leading to a slowdown of the
reaction by an inhibitory after-effect. The original theory was
modified several times, with more recent retrieval accounts
stressing the point that prime retrieval reinstates processing
operations that have been carried out during the prime episode
[39–41]. A recent descendant of episodic retrieval theory is
response retrieval theory which assumes that only the prime
response is recalled in case of a perceptual match between prime
and probe [29]. In that context, the confounding of response
repetition and priming condition was nicely accounted for.
Evidence in the form of results favoring either one or another
theory of NP has accumulated that a combination of distinct
mechanisms might be responsible for the NP effect, e.g.
[14,25,41]. These integrative accounts agree that there are at
least two more or less independent mechanisms that are
responsible for NP, persisting inhibition, e.g. [3], and memory
retrieval, e.g. [8,39].
Although retrieval processes can account for NP effects, they
form only a subordinate part in the selection of a target against a
distractor. Additional, possibly inhibitory processes are necessary
to select information for goal-directed behavior, which are vaguely
described as slow algorithmic processes in the context of the
retrieval theories. Because different processes may interact, it is
difficult to distinguish them by means of behavioral measures
alone [42]. Furthermore the contributions of inhibitory and
retrieval processes might vary considerably depending on subtle
differences between paradigms. For example, it has been found in
several studies that NP may depend on contextual conditions and
other experimental factors [14,43]. On the contrary, a meta
analysis of age-related NP experiments did not find evidence for
the effect that certain paradigms differ significantly in the observed
priming patterns [16].
Studies investigating the NP effect usually aimed at supporting
or rejecting one of the explanatory accounts of NP, e.g. [8,37].
The focus of the current study is on the identification and
localization of the cognitive processes during trial processing which
are related to the interference observable as NP. More specifically,
we argue that trial processing consists of distinct operations that, at
least to some degree, are executed in sequential order: First, the
stimuli are perceived by the visual system; shape, color and other
feature information is extracted. At some stage during perception
and recognition, a target-selecting process comes into play that
modulates the processing of relevant and irrelevant information.
Presumably, these top-down processes operate on early perceptual
representations as well as on higher semantic levels [44,45].
Finally, once the target has been identified, the correct response
must be initiated. At some point during all these parts of trial
processing, the distractor representation is treated differently from
the target representation. The NP effect shows that the distractor is
not perceptually blocked in the beginning (early selection), but
recognized and also memorized. Target and distractor are
therefore processed in parallel for a certain part of a trial, and
at some point the two representations are processed differently
according to their role as distractor or target, respectively. We
believe that it is crucial for the further investigation of the NP
effect to precisely determine its temporal localization relative to
certain aspects of trial processing. Even though the brain is
computing massively in parallel, seriality is an inherent feature of
many brain processes, see e.g. [46]. In the current study we build
on the assumption that some processes can not start to operate
efficiently until other processes have reached a certain degree of
maturity.
There have been various attempts to assign NP to a particular
process, each of which addressed a single aspect. Tipper and
Driver showed that NP is also observable if only a semantic
relation between prime distractor and probe target is given [32].
They concluded that NP cannot be a perceptual phenomenon.
Grison and Strayer found a minor influence of perceptual
manipulations on NP, thus arguing in the same direction [13].
In addition, May et al. concluded in their review of several studies
where perceptual features and response modalities were manip-
ulated that NP is produced at an abstract level [25]. But they
stated that the considered studies all used semantic material, thus
the conclusion that NP acts on a semantic level may be an over-
generalization due to the specific paradigm used. Therefore, May
et al. stated that a larger basis of data is necessary in order to
answer the question at which level of processing NP is produced
[25]. In a recent ERP study we found comparable processing of
distractor-target and target repetition trials in the early stages of a
trial and diverging processing at later stages associated with
activation of higher brain regions [47]. This pattern supports the
following propositions: First, object repetition may lead to a faster
perceptual processing for both NP and PP conditions; second, a
delaying, negative priming effect occurs after the full categoriza-
tion of the stimuli, which is in contrast to predictions derived from
distractor inhibition theory. Thus, the acceleration which is
characteristic for PP appears to be produced by early processes
different from the later ones that seem to be responsible for NP.
This result questions the discussion of NP and PP as two different
byproducts of the same mechanisms.
To separate perceptual effects from those that occur later during
target selection by purely behavioral measures, we resolve a
confound present in most NP studies: the determination of an
object being target or distractor is usually made according to a
NP: Perception, Recognition or Selection Effect?
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entails a greater perceptual dissimilarity for the NP condition as
compared to the PP condition where the target is repeated
identically. Comparing NP and PP with the control condition
therefore cumulates the impact of the switch of the target feature
and the distractor-to-target manipulation. To resolve this conflict,
we introduce a switch of the effective target feature in individual
trials. This simple experimental manipulation allows to orthogo-
nally vary perceptual prime-probe similarity independently of
priming condition: There are both NP and PP conditions with
identical and dissimilar displays.
A switch of the target color could be interpreted as a task switch.
There is a strong basis of literature on task switching and
interference, for reviews see [48,49]. However, the focus is on
interfering task sets, and not on interfering stimuli. Up to our
knowledge, only very few studies considered task switching in
conjunction with NP, see [50]. Implementing a picture naming
and a word reading task with stimuli containing both a word and a
picture, Waszak et al. considered priming effects over several
intervening trials whenever a stimulus has appeared before in any
display [50]. Interferences from two successive trials were not
considered. In comparison, our switching of target color appears
to be a relatively weak manipulation and therefore we expect little
or no effect. In contrast to task switching studies where the subject
had to perform two distinct tasks (e.g. picture naming vs. word
reading), the instruction in our case was identical in all cases:
‘respond to the item shown in the given color’.
A switching of the target feature creating identical prime
distractor probe target pairs was previously implemented in several
studies to compare feature mismatch theory and episodic retrieval,
see e.g. [51]. Furthermore, Tipper implemented a switch in the
target color from red to green in all prime-probe pairs throughout
one experimental block (i.e., all NP conditions showed an identical
prime distractor and probe target) and found a substantial NP
effect [3]. A more complex picture was drawn by Milliken, Tipper,
and Weaver, who found NP occasionally with no clear
dependence on the way of cuing a trial [52]. MacLeod et al.
used words as stimuli and changed target color within every prime-
probe pair [51]. NP was only observed in trials without a target
color switch. In case of the prime distractor having the same color
as the probe target, they found a facilitating effect. One aspect is
common to all the above studies: The switch occurred regularly,
thus predictably. Another important aspect is the lack of trials that
show the repeated object as probe distractor. Therefore, a strong
bias exists to attend both prime target and prime distractor, as they
are very often repeated as the probe target and never as the probe
distractor. We will investigate both aspects in the current study.
We applied the target-feature manipulation in a series of three
experiments implementing a classical voicekey identity negative
priming paradigm [3,30]. Experiment 1 changes the color that
identifies the target between blocks rather than between trials to
assess the general impact of using different colors for target-
selection. This approach allows to identify for a potential
interaction of target color and priming effects in the following
experiments [14]. In Experiment 2 we implemented an unpre-
dictable target color switch on a single trial basis by showing a
color word directly before the stimuli are presented. This
manipulation destroys the confounding of the repeated object
being shown in the same or a different color and the priming
conditions as argued above. Finally, in Experiment 3 the order of
stimuli and color cue was reversed, thus artificially separating the
early phase of trial processing, i.e., stimulus perception and
recognition from the categorization and response generation
phase. This is because a stimulus object can be identified as target
or distractor only after the color cue has been shown. The main
question of Experiment 3 is therefore the presence or absence of
NP in the early processing stage.
All three experiments implemented a comprehensive set of
stimulus conditions, implementing all possibilities of single-object
repetitions. We label the experimental conditions according to
Christie and Klein: control (no repetition), distractor-to-target
(DT), target-to-distractor (TD), target repetition (TT) and
distractor repetition (DD) [53]. Such a condition set results in an
unbiased presentation of stimuli and conditions: Consider the case
when only DT and TT trials are presented. In this case, the
repeated object is always the to-be-attended probe target, which
could bias the subjects to make additional effort to keep track of
both items. Adding DD and TD trials to the condition set balances
the repeated object between being relevant and irrelevant in the
probe trial. Additionally, the design of Experiment 3 requires the
subject to attend to both stimuli in the same way before the target
color is announced. If only DT and TT trials were presented, the
subjects would know the role of the repeated object in the probe
right away. The inclusion of all conditions destroys the bias such
that no information about the probe role of the objects is available
in advance. Finally, the two complementary conditions, TD and
DD, are rarely reported in the literature. This is in contrast to their
potential to assess the validity of any theory on NP because most
theories are general enough to derive predictions also for these
conditions.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was a baseline experiment designed to investigate
priming-specific effects of the two different target colors we will use
in the following experiments. This was a necessary prerequisite for
our main research question which required a target-color switch
on a per-trial basis. There are empirical indications for incidental
features (such as color) to act as moderating factors on priming
effects. One finding is that the NP effect may increase with
growing saliency of the distractors [13,37,54].
With regard to Experiments 2 and 3, where a switch of the
target color always entails a switch of the distractor color,
Experiment 1 was intended to rule out that the target color has
a moderating effect on priming. Such a modulation could be
accounted for in the analysis of the subsequent experiments using
the results from Experiment 1, i.e., determining a correction term
to be applied when pooling responses to red and green targets,
respectively. Even though Experiment 1 was basically a replication
of former identity negative priming experiments, see e.g. [3,30,55],
we present it in full length in order to introduce the baseline
priming effects we expect in our setting. Experiment 1 consisted of
two blocks of trials, one of which implemented green as the target
color, the other one requiring identification and naming of the red
object.
We expected a replication of priming effects usually found in
identity NP studies with visual stimuli and a naming response, see
e.g. [22,47]: While TT trials usually cause a strong acceleration
(PP), the acceleration is weaker in DD trials. DT and TD trials
show a deceleration (NP) which is often weaker for TD trials.
Reaction times in response to green targets were expected to be
longer than in response to red targets due to the higher saliency of
the color red as compared to green. Based on studies on the
impact of distractor saliency on priming as well as our own
simulations using an adaptive-threshold model of NP [30], we
expected the DT and TD effect to be stronger for red distractors
than for green ones, and the acceleration of TT and DD trials to
be weaker with green targets.
NP: Perception, Recognition or Selection Effect?
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32946Method
Participants. Thirty young adults (19 female, 11 male) took
part in the study (M=24.5 years, SD=1.6 years). The participants
were rewarded with course credits or paid 15 . All subjects had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no color discrimination
disabilities. They were not informed about the specific purpose of
the experiment and had not taken part in a previous study
employing similar stimulus material. The study was reviewed and
approved by the Ethics Committee of the MPI for Dynamics and
Self-Organization, Go ¨ttingen. The Committee did not require
that informed consent was given for the experiment: voluntary
participation in the task was accepted as implied consent.
Materials. Stimuli were six different objects, represented by
hand-drawn pictograms that either were shown in green or in red
color. The stimuli were designed to possess a number of desirable
qualities such as a comparable visual complexity and spatial
coverage. The comparability of the objects was validated in pilot
studies and the stimuli were already successfully used in some NP
studies [22,30,56]. As the modality of response, we used voice
recording together with a sound level threshold to determine the
reaction time for every trial. We therefore chose object labels that
commence with a plosive and consist of a single syllable for a sharp
onset of the sound signal. The experiment was conducted in
German language and the corresponding labels were Bus, Ball,
Baum, Buch, Bett, Bank (bus, ball, tree, book, bed, bench).
Design. We implemented a 5 (priming: CO, DT, TT, TD,
DD)|2 (target color: red, green) design. Both factors were varied
within-subject. Target color was kept constant during blocks of
210 trials each and blocks were presented in random order across
subjects. Object presentation was balanced across the different
priming conditions as well as their appearance as target or
distractor using a software designed for avoiding sequence
structure [57]: Each of the pictograms appeared an equal
number of times (both as target and distractor) and the number
of trials was counterbalanced across the stimulus-repetition
conditions.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in a special
chamber optimized for low noise and standardized lighting
conditions. Participants were tested individually in sessions that
lasted no longer than one hour. Before the start of the experiment,
the line drawings of the experimental stimuli along with their
names were presented in a neutral black coloring. The subjects
were told that in each trial they would see two of these objects
overlapping one another, one drawn in green and the other one
drawn in red. Participants were instructed to name the target
objects as quickly and correctly as possible while ignoring the
superimposed distractor object. To familiarize participants with
the experimental procedure, 30 practice trials preceded the main
session.
Experiment 1 consisted of two parts of 210 trials each,
subdivided into 5 blocks of 42 trials. After each block, subjects
were allowed to take a short break. In a single trial, subjects were
shown the following series of displays: (1) a fixation cross, centered
on the screen for 500 ms, (2) a display containing two
superimposed objects in the focal area until the subject responded
but no longer than 2 seconds and (3) a blank screen for a
randomized duration drawn uniformly from the interval between
0 and 1000 ms, as this procedure has proven in our lab to produce
pronounced priming effects. The effective response-to-stimulus
interval (RSI) was therefore a random duration between 500 ms
and 1500 ms. An exemplary sequence of displays of four trials
requiring a response to green objects is shown in Fig. 1. Behavioral
errors were noted by the experimenters when subjects failed to
give the correct answer.
Outlier correction. All reaction times from trials in which a
behavioral error occurred were excluded from the analysis
together with the immediate successor. Reaction times below
250ms, above 3000ms and those where the difference to the mean
of the experimental condition of the particular subject exceeded
two times the standard deviation were also excluded. Finally, the
first two trials of each block of 42 trials were removed from the
dataset to avoid the inclusion of transient effects when the subjects
restart the task after a break. In summary, not more than 10% of
trials per condition and subject were excluded from the analysis.
Results
Reaction times. The repeated-measures ANOVA on target
color (red, green)|priming (CO, DT, TT, TD, DD) yielded main
effects for color, F(1,29)~40:86, pv0:01, and for priming,
F(4,116)~30:90, pv0:01, but no interaction between the two,
F(4,116)~0:28, p~0:89. All four priming conditions show
priming effects in the expected directions (DT: t(29)~{3:1,
pv0:01; TT: t(29)~6:1, pv0:01; TD: t(29)~{2:9, pv0:01;
DD: t(29)~4:3, pv0:01), see also Table 1. Throughout the
paper, all t-tests were corrected for multiple comparisons using
Holm’s method [58]. According to the main effect in the above
ANOVA, responses to red targets, 709 ms (sd=95 ms), are faster
than responses to green targets, 758 ms (sd=89 ms).
Error rates
The two-way ANOVA on error rates with factors target color
(red, green)|priming (CO, DT, TT, TD, DD) yielded no main
effect of color F(1,29)~0:29. The main effect of priming just
missed significance F(4,116)~2:14, p~0:079. The interaction
between the two was not significant, F(4,116)~0:50. Generally,
the error rates were too low to yield any significant results.
Discussion
Experiment 1 produced the expected priming effects for all
conditions: Independently of target color, we found a response
facilitation in TT and DD trials and a deceleration in DT and TD
trials. Furthermore, we observed a main effect of target color,
indicating that reactions to green targets were slower than
reactions to red targets. There was no interaction between target
color and priming.
Figure 1. An example sequence of stimuli of Experiment 1 in the part with target color green. All realized experimental conditions are
shown except the control condition, i.e., unrelated objects in prime and probe. The fixation cross is omitted in the shown sequence for clarity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.g001
NP: Perception, Recognition or Selection Effect?
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many existing studies, e.g. [3]. It has been shown that negative
priming may depend on the composition of the trial sequence, e.g.
[3,7,9,10,55]. It is therefore interesting to note that the classical
effects also occur in a setting where additional priming conditions
(DD/TD) have been realized. The results from TD and DD
conditions are also in accordance with previous investigations [56].
The shorter reaction times for red targets are presumably due to
the higher saliency of the color red. The higher saliency apparently
helps to guide attention to the target which facilitates recognition
and categorization [59].
The strong priming effects found in Experiment 1 proved the
suitability of the voicekey paradigm for the issue addressed in this
paper. The missing interaction of target color and priming
facilitates the analysis of the subsequent experiments. Because of
the missing interaction, it is not necessary to consider target color
as a factor in the other experiments which mix trials with red and
green targets on a per-trial basis.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to assign the reaction-time effects in
the priming conditions to perceptual processing or possible
interferences during later processing steps, i.e., target selection
and response generation. Extending Experiment 1, we introduced
a trial-wise target-color switch in the form of a color word
indicating the target color in the current trial (see Fig. 2). Besides
the color switch on a per-trial basis, the experimental procedure
was identical to that of Experiment 1. As argued above, the color
switch resolved the confounding of priming and perceptual
similarity, i.e., whether an object was repeated in the same color
or not. For example, we realized TT trials where the repeated
target was shown in a different color in prime and probe even
though color was the feature used for target selection.
Retrieval theories explain the NP effect in terms of memory
processes. They suggest that memory retrieval is initiated
depending on the degree of similarity of prime and probe stimulus
and so causes interference in case of a mismatch [8]. Both episodic
retrieval and response retrieval theory thus postulate that the NP
effect predominantly occurs in the later phases of trial-processing:
at least the perceptual processes have to reach a certain stage such
that a match of the current percept and the memorized episode
can be determined. While original episodic retrieval attributes the
effect to a mismatch between the entire prime and probe episodes,
response-retrieval theory postulates an interference only between
actual and retrieved probe response [29]. Since retrieval of
episodes is said to depend on the degree of similarity between the
two displays, priming effects are modulated by the perceptual
change of the repeated object.
In contrast to the overall priming effect, the above observation
implies that a better match leads to a stronger effect, because
already the pure repetition of an object is said to trigger the
retrieval of the prime episode [38]. Equivalently, retrieval theories
expect an acceleration of the response for TT trials in both no-
switch and in switch conditions due to the supporting content of
the episode (or response) retrieved from the prime trial. Minor
Table 1. Summary of results of Experiment 1.
Target color
Red Green
Condition Mean RT [ms]
a Error rate [%]
a Mean RT [ms]
a Error rate [%]
a
CO 718:3 (100:7) 2.1 (3.3) 767:6 (102:3) 1.4 (2.2)
DT 741:3 (110:0) 2.8 (2.5) 787:6 (97:9) 2.2 (2.9)
TT 660:4 (81:1) 1.4 (2.4) 717:2 (80:4) 1.6 (2.4)
TD 733:0 (121:5) 1.9 (2.3) 780:7 (96:3) 2.2 (2.2)
DD 693:3 (97:4) 2.2 (2.6) 738:3 (88:6) 2.3 (3.1)
Priming effects
b
Mean RT [ms] Error rate [%] Mean RT [ms] Error rate [%]
DT {23:0 20.71 {20:0 20.79
TT 57:9 0.63 50:4 20.16
TD {14:7 0.16 {13:1 20.79
DD 25:0 20.16 29:3 20.87
aStandard deviation in parentheses.
bDifference of CO and priming condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.t001
Figure 2. An example sequence of stimuli of Experiment 2. A trial begins with the display of a grey color word, followed by the actual stimuli.
The fixation cross is omitted in the shown sequence for clarity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.g002
NP: Perception, Recognition or Selection Effect?
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by the different perceptual similarity: If the percepts are identical,
the search in memory for the stored episode might be faster and
more accurate compared to identical objects that differ in color.
In contrast, distractor inhibition theory assigns NP to an
impaired semantic recognition of the repeated object due to
persisting inhibition in the case that the object was presented as
prime distractor [3]. Distractor inhibition theory assumes that
inhibition occurs during the recognition process, which consists of
perception and semantic categorization. However, because
inhibition is assumed to operate on a semantic, cognitive
representation of the objects, no dependency of the NP effect on
the switch of target color is predicted. The distractor inhibition
theory postulates a residual activation of the semantic represen-
tation of the prime target and thus predicts an acceleration in TT
switch trials.
Both of the two prominent NP theories explain negative and
positive priming in the same conceptual framework. In contrast,
evidence from a recent event-related potential (ERP) study by
Behrendt et al. suggests that NP and PP are caused by different
cognitive processes [47]. According to their results, positive
priming as it occurs in traditional TT trials is a perceptual
phenomenon because priming correlates, i.e., differences to the
ERP of a control trial, occur in early, perceptual stages of the
ERP. For DT trials, the early EEG reflecting perceptual processes
is similar to the one in TT trials, indicating an easier recognition
due to stimulus repetition. Only on a later processing stage the
ERPs of both conditions diverge. This result indicates that the
deceleration in DT trials is not a perceptual phenomenon but
rather happens later, during semantic processing.
From these considerations, we derive predictions for Experi-
ment 2. Following distractor inhibition theory, NP should be
independent of perceptual similarity, whereas episodic retrieval
predicts a stronger effect for identically repeated items. The
situation is less clear for positive priming. In accordance with the
theories, we expect a deceleration in DT trials to occur both in
switch and in no-switch trials because they are caused by processes
at a conceptual level. Conversely, based on the study by Behrendt
et al., we expect the acceleration in no-switch TT trials to vanish
in trials implementing a switch of the target color [47]. This
prediction is due to the attribution of positive priming to an early,
perceptual stage of trial processing. For the TD and DD condition,
we do not have a dedicated reference attributing it either to
perceptual or to conceptual processing. We therefore argue
tentatively, based on the empirical experience with TD and DD
conditions [56,60], that TD will produce similar effects as the DT
condition and that DD will produce effects that are comparable to
the TT condition. Reaction times in DD trials were assumed to
benefit from a facilitated figure-ground separation which is
produced by the afterimage of the distractor from the prime trial
[56].
Method
Participants. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were run in a
single session, thus the subjects in both experiments were identical.
Materials. Besides the color-cue (‘‘rot’’ (red) or ‘‘gru ¨n’’
(green)) displayed in grey and centered on the screen to indicate
the current target color, the displays were identical to the ones in
Experiment 1.
Design. A 5 (priming: CO, DT, TT, TD, DD)|2 (color
switch: switch, no-switch) design was realized where both factors
were varied within-subject. Note that the stimulus displays were
identical for pairs of priming|switch conditions. The following
conditions had an identical stimulus display: DT & DD switch, TT
& TD switch, TD & TT switch and DD & DT switch.
Particularly, trials that did not require a color switch differed
from trials in Experiment 1 only in the presence of the color cue
preceding the stimuli, see Fig. 2. The effective response stimulus
interval was longer as compared to Experiment 1, because the
subject’s processing of the cue added to it.
Procedure. Experiment 2 consisted of 420 trials with breaks
every 42 trials. We implemented a standard way of unpredictable
task switches by pseudo-randomly presenting a color cue, i.e., a
color word presented in grey, indicating the target color for each
trial. The presentation of the color cue in a neutral color avoided
possible cue mismatch influences, e.g. [61]. The color cue was
removed after a button press by the subject and the actual trial was
started, see Fig. 2.
Results
Reaction times. All reaction times and error rates are
summarized in Table 2. The two-way ANOVA with factors
color switch (switch, no switch)|priming (CO, DT, TT, TD, DD)
yielded significant main effects for switch, F(1,29)~28:52,
pv0:01, and for priming, F(4,116)~9:62, pv0:01, and a
tendency for a significant switch by priming interaction,
F(4,116)~2:34, p~0:059. Thus, trials that followed a target
color switch, 822 ms (sd=129 ms), were slower than trials not
requiring a color switch, 805 ms (sd=118 ms). In order to further
investigate the origin of the tendencial interaction, we ran separate
ANOVAs for the different priming conditions.
The ANOVA switch|(CO, DT) yielded tendencial main
effects for switch, F(1,29)~3:71, p~0:06, and for priming,
F(1,29)~4:09, p~0:05, and no significant interaction between
the two, F(1,29)~0:063. DT was slower than CO (D~21ms).
The ANOVA switch|(CO, TT) yielded main effects for switch,
F(1,29)~18:47, pv0:01, and for priming, F(1,29)~7:21,
pv0:05, as well as a significant interaction between the two,
F(1,29)~5:05, pv0:05. Detailed t-tests showed that in the no-
switch case TT was faster (D~44ms) than CO, t(29)~3:3,
pv0:01, whereas for color switch trials TT was not significantly
different from CO, t(29)~0:29, p~0:39.
The ANOVA switch|(CO, TD) yielded main effects for
switch, F(1,29)~9:52, pv0:01, and for priming, F(1,29)~4:30,
pv0:05, but no significant interaction between the two,
F(1,29)~0:05. TD was slower than CO (D~20ms). The
ANOVA switch|(CO, DD) did not yield any significant effects.
Error rates. The two-way ANOVA on error rates with
factors color switch (switch, no switch)|priming (CO, DT, TT,
TD, DD) yielded neither significant main effects for switch
F(1,29)~1:27 or color F(4,116)~0:54, nor an interaction
between the two F(4,116)~0:86. Again, the error rates were
too low to yield any interpretable results, see Table 2.
Discussion
Results were consistent with our hypotheses: In color repetition
trials priming effects were similar to those found in Experiment 1,
and the introduction of the switch affected the priming effects as
predicted. While the effects in the DT and TD conditions were
independent of the color switch, they disappeared in the TT
condition when the target color was switched. Color switch trials
were slower than color repetition trials.
The longer response-stimulus interval (RSI) compared to
Experiment 1 could have influenced priming effects [6]. However,
the only difference between the results of Experiment 1 and color
repetition trials in Experiment 2 was that the acceleration in DD
trials vanished. Therefore, the impact of the prolonged RSI
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other three conditions. Switch trials were slower than those which
repeated the target color. The general slowdown can be attributed
to the updating of the task set [62] whenever a probe color cue was
presented that was different to the prime target color. Thus the
subjects had to adjust the stimulus processing accordingly, which
led to the observed effects.
According to the findings of Experiment 1 and previous studies
[29,56,63], we expected an acceleration in DD trials, which could
be explained by a figure-ground separation effect. In contrast, in
Experiment 2, we found no priming effect for DD in no-switch
trials, which can be explained by the destruction of the afterimage
by the color cue which might have effectively operated as a
masking stimulus [64].
Priming effects in DT and TD conditions were independent of a
color switch. This could either reflect opposing influences, e.g. a
speeded recognition of the identically presented prime distractor
and a more pronounced slowing due to the stronger retrieval, or,
in agreement with EEG correlates [47] the fact that perceptual
processes play a minor role in the slowdown of reactions in DT
and TD trials. Negative interference apparently happens on a
semantic level of processing or later during response generation.
Only priming in the TT condition showed a dependency on the
color switch. When no switch was required, classical positive
priming was observed, i.e., TT trials were much faster than CO
trials. However, in case the target color switched and the
perceptual identity was thus destroyed, the positive priming effect
disappeared. The degree of perceptual match of the target
apparently has a large modulating effect on PP. This might be
taken as further evidence for the position that if perceptual
processes do not directly account for PP, they at least form a
window towards those facilitatory effects.
Although the identical repetition of the prime target in a TT no-
switch trial confounds with an identical target color cue, cueing
both the prime and probe trial, we think it is rather unlikely that
the target-cue was integrated into episodic memory along with the
target and distractor stimuli. Spatiotemporal proximity has often
been demonstrated as necessary for feature-binding [65]. In fact, it
is a necessary prerequisite for binding that stimuli be perceived as
‘‘belonging to one another’’ in a perceptualgrouping sense [66].
Certainly, this was not the case in our setup: The target cue
appeared temporally separated from the distractor and target
stimuli.
An alternative explanation of the disappearing PP effect in TT
switch trials would be the response repetition effect [67] which is a
bias to respond differently in case of a change in the stimuli. Due
to our confounding of experimental condition and response
relation, see [29], i.e., responses are only repeated in TT trials, we
cannot address this question within our paradigm. In constrast to
the DD condition, PP is not sensitive to the masking effect by the
color word. While the acceleration in DD trials seems to occur in
an early perceptual phase, the attention attributed to the target
makes the percept survive the color cue.
The conclusion that PP in TT conditions is sensitive to
differences in perceptual processes implies that positive and
negative priming are caused by different cognitive processes and
that explaining both effects in the same theoretical framework
might be an inadequate approach. This is reflected by the failure
of both inhibition and retrieval theories to predict the missing
acceleration in TT conditions for color-switch trials observed in
our experiment. As a consequence, we suggest that future efforts to
find explanations for NP should focus on the conditions that
involve role-reversal (DT and TD). A limiting of the explanatory
range of NP theories might help to finally converge at a generally
accepted and simple theory of NP.
Experiment 2 indicates that NP is not a perceptual phenom-
enon, in fact, it provides a temporal allocation of NP effects to the
late processing stages of a trial: The interference happens during
semantic processing of the stimuli, in the interval from stimulus
classification to response generation. These processes include
semantic recognition of stimuli, selection of the target against the
distractor and response selection. In order to explore the origins of
NP in more detail, we carried out a third experiment providing a
distinction of trial processing into recognition of stimuli and
selection of the response.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, we found NP to be independent from
perceptual identity but rather is produced during later processing,
Table 2. Summary of results of Experiment 2.
Color repetition Color switch
Condition Mean RT [ms]
a Error rate [%]
a Mean RT [ms]
a Error rate [%]
a
CO 793:6 (127:9) 2.0 (2.8) 812:2 (135:4) 2.2 (3.2)
DT 811:5 (106:1) 2.1 (2.0) 835:5 (156:8) 2.0 (1.9)
TT 749:5 (111:1) 1.9 (2.2) 808:7 (127:2) 2.1 (2.8)
TD 811:7 (134:7) 1.6 (2.2) 834:7 (133:1) 1.8 (2.1)
DD 805:0 (123:9) 1.8 (2.4) 807:6 (124:1) 2.8 (3.3)
Priming effects
b
Mean RT [ms] Error rate [%] Mean RT [ms] Error rate [%]
DT {17:9 20.16 {23:4 0.24
TT 44:1 0.08 3:5 0.16
TD {18:1 0.4 {22:5 0.4
DD {11:4 0.24 4:6 0.56
aStandard deviation in parentheses.
bDifference of CO and priming condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.t002
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stages, at least to some part, a sequential processing takes place:
The stimuli have to be recognized before the response can be
determined. To assess the temporal localization of NP in the later
part, we slightly altered our paradigm. We realized a temporal
separation of the two processes using a technically simple
manipulation, the presentation of the target color cue after the
stimulus objects had been identified, see Fig. 3. The subjects were
instructed to indicate when they had finished the identification of
the stimuli by a button press. The immediately following
replacement of the stimuli by the color word triggered the
response-selection.
Even though the question whether the objects are sufficiently
recognized seems rather introspective, subjects easily solved the
tradeoff between fast and correct responses. For efficient
responding, subjects had to avoid an early button press which
would have erased the stimuli and made a response impossible as
well as a late button press which would unnessecarily prolong the
response. Without the color cue, no information about the role of
the objects as target or distractor was available to the subjects. We
thereby ensured that object recognition and target and response
selection were processed in a strictly sequential order.
The interpretation of the interferences with former episodes
during target selection and response generation is not unambig-
uous. Therefore, we will focus on the perception and recognition
part of a trial, i.e. from stimulus onset to the button press. We
assume that the subjects were primed similarly as in Experiment 2
at the beginning of the probe trial: At the end of the prime trial,
subjects had given the response and were thus likely to have had a
strong mental representation of the target object even though it
was not visually present. Also the intermediate color word is given
in both experiments. We argue that, in order to select the target
out of the stimulus compound, the memorized distractor had to be
ignored similarly as in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus the difference
between Experiment 2 and 3 lies exclusively in the processing of
the perceptual phase: Both objects have to be attended to instead
of just the current target.
For the RT in the recognition phase in our paradigm, distractor
inhibition theory predicts a negative priming effect in trials where
the distractor is repeated. This is independent of the color of the
presented stimulus, as the semantic representation of the distractor
is supposed to be inhibited [3]. Correspondingly, trials where the
prime target is repeated should produce a positive priming effect
because the prime target representation would still be activated.
Clearly, in TT trials with repeated target color, a faster recognition
is expected resulting from the higher perceptual match. In
contrast, memory-based explanations of NP expect NP to happen
at least to a considerable extent later in a trial [8]. Thus, a
presence of NP in the early recognition phase would favor
distractor inhibition theory. Conversely, an absence of NP in the
early phase would favor retrieval theories.
Following the retrieval approaches, the findings from our ERP
study [47], and on the basis of the results from Experiment 2, we
expect an acceleration of the recognition phase in all trials where
an object is repeated from prime to probe, i.e., all four priming
conditions. In addition, when the stimulus is repeated identically
the acceleration should be faster than for repetitions in a different
color.
Method
Participants. Twenty young adults (13 female, 7 male) were
tested (M=23.7 years, SD=1.45 years). They received course
credit or were paid 10 . All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, no color discrimination disabilities and were
naı ¨ve about the aims of the experiment. Again, the study was
reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the MPI for
Dynamics and Self-Organization, Go ¨ttingen. The Committee did
not require that informed consent was given for the experiment:
voluntary participation in the task was accepted as implied
consent.
Materials. The identification of stimuli before the target
selection was much more demanding for the subjects as
compared to Experiments 1 and 2. This led several subjects in
a preliminary study to use an afterimage strategy which shifted
part of the stimulus identification to the selection phase of the
trial. This strategy interfered with our assumption of seriality. In
order to enforce a serial trial processing, we introduced a mask
between the stimulus presentation and the appearance of the
target cue. The mask consisted of red and green dots at the
location of the stimulus compound in a similar density. The
effectiveness of the mask to destroy the afterimage was confirmed
in a pilot study. All other stimuli were identical to the ones used
in Experiment 2.
Design. Although the experimental manipulation between
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 is minimal, there is a difference in
the design as we analyse only the recognition part of a trial. Our
reaction time marker was the recorded button press of the subjects,
which indicates a subjective recognition of both the green and the
red object. This initiated the replacement of the two stimuli by the
color word cue. The reaction time corresponding to that button
press is interpreted as the time to recognize both objects and was
subject to our analysis of Experiment 3. As in the early trial phase
there is no knowledge about whether or not the target color was
switched, therefore we do not have the same factorial design as in
Experiment 2. The experimental conditions are defined by
whether the repeated object is shown identically or in a different
color in the probe trial. We label the conditions as Ts (target
repetition in the same color), Td (target repetition in a different
color), Ds (distractor repetition in the same color), Dd (distractor
repetition in a different color).
Procedure. Experiment 3 only differed from Experiment 2
by the order in which the color cue and the stimulus objects were
presented. The subjects were confronted with target and distractor
in the beginning of a trial and had to press a button when they had
recognized both stimulus objects. Between the stimulus objects and
the target color cue, subjects saw a mask for 100 ms in order to
erase any afterimage. The color cue was present until the subject
responded.
Figure 3. An example sequence of stimuli of Experiment 3. A trial begins with the display of the stimulus compound which is replaced by the
color cue after a button press by the subjects. The fixation cross and the mask are omitted in the shown sequence for clarity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.g003
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Reaction times. All reaction times and error rates are
summarized in Table 3. The one-way ANOVA on priming
conditions (CO, Ts, Ds, Td, Dd) yielded a main effect for
priming, F(4,76)~8:66, pv0:01. Reaction times showed an
acceleration in Ts, t(19)~4:6, pv0:01, Td, t(19)~2:8, pv0:05,
Ds, t(19)~3:2, pv0:01, and Dd trials, t(19)~2, pv0:05.A s
expected, the acceleration effects in trials with identically repeated
objects were stronger (D=64 ms) than in trials with objects being
repeated in a different color t(19)~3:8, pv0:01. Note that the
analysis is based only on the recognition reaction times.
Error rates. The one-way ANOVA on priming conditions
(CO, Ts, Ds, Td, Dd) yielded no main effect for priming,
F(4,76)~1:12 Still, error rates were too low to produce
considerable effects, see Table 3.
Discussion
The fact that a faster recognition of the stimulus objects was
observable at all priming conditions points to perceptual benefits
for repeated stimuli. An identical repetition of the prime target led
to the fastest reaction. The accelerations of the recognition in all
four priming conditions can originate either from a higher
perceptual or semantic match. Episodic retrieval theory suggests
memory retrieval to be modulated by the perceptual match, which
can explain the difference of trials with a repetition in the same or
in a different color [39]. The theory states that memory retrieval
acts in parallel to a slower, direct computation of the appropriate
response and facilitates responding once retrieval is completed [8].
This could be understood as a modulation at the stage of response
selection. In our paradigm, response selection is not part of the
recognition time and therefore, particularly response retrieval
theory [29] cannot directly explain the recognition benefits we
observed. A possible line of argumentation would be that both
probe objects are attended like a target in the recognition phase,
i.e., a selection of two out of the possible six responses takes place.
In that case, episodic retrieval theory would postulate a reaction
time modulation by retrieval of information from the prime trial.
Nevertheless, in such a scenario the incongruent information in Ds
and Dd trials should lead to a deteriorated response, which was
not observed. The greater acceleration for prime target repetition
could also be caused by a certain strategy to look for the prime
target first.
Given that in the response phase the target has to be selected
against the distractor, distractor inhibition theory assumes residual
inhibition from the prime trial to produce NP by hampering the
activation of the distractor representation [3]. Thus, distractor
inhibition predicts a slowdown already in the recognition phase in
Dd and Ds trials. Concerning PP the theory is not very explicit.
Simulations of a neural implementation of distractor inhibition
theory [68] produce a reaction time benefit by residual activation
of the prime target, but of a lower magnitude compared to
inhibition in the NP case. In contrast comparable studies usually
show larger PP than NP effects [22,30].
We favor the explanation of the recognition benefits being
perceptually caused. This means that any repetition of an object
leads to a faster perceptual processing. If the object is repeated
identically and was attended in the prime trial, perceptual
acceleration is even stronger. This interpretation fits nicely with
the results from the EEG study of Behrendt et al. [47]. We
therefore postulate the emergence of NP to be a correlate of the
selection aspect of selective attention.
Discussion
In the current study we introduced an experimental approach to
disentangle the cognitive processes underlying the negative
priming effect in identity priming paradigms. According to our
results, positive priming is highly dependent on perceptual
similarity, while NP is not. Furthermore we showed that during
semantic recognition no NP is observable. We conclude that NP is
produced in later stages of a trial, it seems to be a product of target
selection or response generation. With a series of three
experiments we addressed the question whether NP is produced
in the perceptual processing stages of an experimental trial.
Experiment 1 focused on the interaction between target color and
priming effects. In Experiment 2 the target color was varied trial-
wise in an unpredictable order. In this way we reproduced prime-
probe pairs that were perceptually identical to the standard
conditions, although their experimental condition was different for
different target colors. We were thus able to consider an effect
being perceptually produced versus occurring during semantic
processing of the trial. Experiment 3 went a step further by
considering not only the perceptual phase but the recognition of
both stimuli that were not identifiable as target and distractor
before the recognition response.
Experiment 1 replicated typical priming effects found in
voicekey identity negative priming paradigms: A strong acceler-
ation of reactions in TT trials, a weaker acceleration in DD trials,
a deceleration in DT trials and a weak deceleration in TD trials.
The target color contributed to the reaction times such that
responding to red targets was faster than responding to green
targets, presumably because of the higher saliency of the color red.
Importantly, no interaction between target color and priming
effects was observed, providing an adequate basis for the following
two experiments which mixed trials with red or green as target
color.
Experiment 2 showed results similar to Experiment 1 in trials
with no target color change. However, in trials requiring a target
color switch, a very interesting pattern arose: While the strong
acceleration in TT trials vanished, DT and TD trials showed no
difference to their no-switch counterparts even though the display
was identical to the no-switch TT condition. The absence of
positive priming in TT switch trials strongly suggests that PP is
dependent on perceptual processes. The fact that the NP effect in
Table 3. Summary of results of Experiment 3.
Condition Mean RT [ms]
a Error rate [%]
a
CO 1731:9 (574:4) 4.5 (3.4)
Dd 1687:1 (552:1) 3.9 (3.2)
Ts 1583:8 (530:9) 3.5 (2.9)
Td 1680:8 (547:4) 3.5 (1.6)
Ds 1657:0 (548:2) 4.2 (2.4)
Priming effects
b
Mean RT [ms] Error rate [%]
Dd 44:8 0.5
Ts 148:1 1.0
Td 51:1 0.9
Ds 74:8 0.3
aStandard deviation in parentheses.
bDifference of CO and priming condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032946.t003
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switch indicates that NP has no perceptual basis, but that the
phenomenon is due to interferences on a semantic level of
processing.
Experiment 3 was successful in demonstrating an acceleration of
the recognition time in all priming conditions with identical target
repetition producing faster reactions than the other three
conditions which were statistically indistinguishable. A grouped
analysis revealed that the repetition of an object in the same color
leads to a highly significant acceleration as compared to an object
being repeated in a different color. Experiment 3 showed that
before a semantic recognition of the stimuli no slowing is present.
Instead, trials showing a repeated object are faster in general.
In summary, we found evidence for PP, unlike NP, to be a
perceptual phenomenon. Furthermore, we conclude that NP is not
produced during semantic recognition, but is a consequence of
selection mechanisms. Thus, even if PP and NP are usually
considered together, they are caused by different processes, which
has severe theoretical implications. The devotion of PP to
perceptual processes is problematic for both retrieval theories as
well as distractor inhibition theory because they attempt to explain
PP and NP in a single framework. The inclusion of PP in a
theoretical account leads the theory away from a simple
description.
Distractor inhibition theory hypothesizes the NP effect to be a
product of persistent inhibition carried over from the prime trial as
a consequence of the selection mechanisms during prime
processing [3]. Thus, NP should be most prominent at the
beginning of a trial, when the perceptual activation collides with
the residual inhibition of the object representation. Distractor
inhibition can explain NP being independent of a target color
switch in Experiment 2, as it assumes the inhibition to act on
semantic representations and not on early perceptual processes.
But the inclusion of semantic recognition in the first phase of
Experiment 3 did not produce NP as predicted by distractor
inhibition, but rather an acceleration also in Dd trials. Even
though accelerations in TT trials are much less prominent in the
implementation of distractor inhibition theory [31], the theory is
in general able to explain accelerations in the recognition phase if
a relevant object is repeated by persistent excitation.
Response retrieval theory inherently assumes all effects to be
produced primarily during response selection, i.e., the last phase of
trial processing. Depending on how literally the statements of
response retrieval theory are taken, the temporal determination of
PP during recognition is either problematic for the theory or not.
On the one hand, response retrieval explicitly links all priming
effects to the automatic retrieval of the prime response, which
implies no priming effects early in the trial [29]. On the other
hand, both retrieval theories lack a description of the assumed slow
algorithmic trial processing which might account for early priming
effects. Furthermore, retrieval theories do not exclude the
involvement of additional processes explicitly which could also
be a source of reaction time effects.
Episodic retrieval theory explains the finding that NP is caused
by selection mechanisms in a straightforward manner. In case the
retrieved episode is incongruent to the current trial, i.e., differing
roles of the repeated object, or differing responses, the arising
conflicts have to be resolved [8,39]. This resolution consumes time
which results in NP effects. In addition, episodic retrieval theory
can well explain the acceleration of the recognition in all priming
conditions, as it assumes a recall of the entire prime episode in
parallel to recognition. The representation of the repeated object is
thus driven both by the percept as well as by the recalled memory,
recognition of a repeated object is accelerated as compared to
unrelated displays. Concerning the even stronger acceleration in
Ts trials, two mechanisms could simultaneously modulate priming
in the context of episodic retrieval theory: different encoding
strengths of objects according to their relevance, and a modulating
effect of perceptual match on retrieval strength.
Future research could address the issue that the design of the
present study does not allow us to answer the question whether NP
is produced during target or response selection. The reason is a
confound of target identity and response inherent to the present
voicekey paradigm. This confound has been the subject of a recent
debate [29] and can be resolved by an orthogonal variation of
response and target identity. This can e.g. be achieved using a
comparison task, e.g. [56] instead of the identification task used in
the current study.
Summarizing, we have presented a novel approach for splitting
trial processing into consecutive stages in order to consider
priming effects in these stages individually. In order to establish
our paradigm, we started a series of three experiments with a
generic identity-NP paradigm and varied only the target color. In
the second experiment the target color was randomly altered on
each trial. In this way NP trials could be performed with identical
stimuli and repetition priming trials with non-identical stimuli.
The most interesting result from this experiment is the
disappearance of positive priming in case of a color switch, while
NP is unaffected by a target color switch. In the third experiment,
the target color was revealed only after the stimuli were
recognized. This allowed us to separate stimulus recognition and
target selection. In the recognition phase, no NP was observed, but
all four stimulus repetition conditions led to faster recognition
times.
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